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Abstract
This paper analyses the welfare effects of a change from centralized to decentralized political
authority. The potential disadvantage with decentralization in our model is that local
dominant groups with rather “extreme” preferences may win the vote and implement policies
that harm the well-being of local minorities. When the national median voter represents a
“moderate” position, centralization can be seen as a way of protecting the interests of local
minorities. Our main result is that the centralized solution may welfare dominate
decentralization even in the absence of scale economics and interregional spillovers. We also
demonstrate that increased segregation, increased mobility, and increased heterogeneity in
preferences, factors that are normally considered to be arguments in favor of decentralization,
may reduce the attractiveness of the decentralized solution from a welfare perspective.
Finally, we show that when the national median voter is an “extreme” type, decentralization
may represent a way of protecting local minority interests.
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 1 Introduction
In a pluralistic world where individuals disagree about the ideal public pol-
icy there is always latent conﬂict. Not everyone can get his or her ideal
policy realized. Democratic institutions can be seen as ways of ensuring
that compromises are reached. This will be the case if the decisive voter
represents a moderate position. However, we cannot always be sure that a
democratic vote results in a compromise solution. Majority interests with
rather “extreme” preferences may win the vote, and implement policies that
are radically at odds with the interests of minorities.
Protection of minority interests was seen by the founding fathers of the
American constitution as one of the main advantages of a union. Madi-
son argued in the federalist papers that: “Among the numerous advantages
promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately
developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.”
Elaborating on his position, he states that: “The smaller the society, the
fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority
be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals com-
posing a majority, and the smaller the compass in which they are placed,
the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Ex-
tend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive
to invade the rights of other citizens.” (Madison 1787). Madison’s argument
that the political inﬂuence of oppressive groups, which is the equivalent of
groups with extreme preferences in our context, may be great in small ju-
risdictions but relatively small in large jurisdictions, comes very close to the
central message of the present paper.
The distribution of political authority between central and local jurisdic-
tions is a very topical issue in the political debate in most countries also
today. The costs and beneﬁts of central and local public ﬁnance is the cen-
t r a lt h e m ei nt h ee c o n o m i cl i t e r a t u r eo nﬁscal federalism. Generally speaking,
this literature is relatively sympathetic to decentralization of public provision
of goods and services. The beneﬁts of decentralization are captured by the
well-known “decentralization theorem” (Oates, 1972). This theorem states
that, in the absence of scale economies and inter-regional spillovers, welfare
maximizing local authorities may tailor the supply of local public services
to local tastes, and thereby achieve a solution that is welfare superior to the
solution provided by the central government. As stated by Oates (1994, page
1130): “The tailoring of outputs to local circumstances will, in general, pro-
duce higher levels of well-being than a centralized decision to provide some
uniform level of output across all jurisdictions. And such gains do not depend
upon any mobility across jurisdictional boundaries.” Mobility increases the
regional segregation of the population and therefore strengthens the bene-
ﬁts of local autonomy. This is the essence of the Tiebout model (Tiebout
1956). But, as emphasized by Oates, mobility of voters is not essential to
the decentralization theorem.
The present paper demonstrates that the tailoring of public policies to
local tastes may not only be the main beneﬁt of decentralization, it could
also be its greatest weakness. The reason why the decentralization theorem
does not necessarily hold in our setting is that we model collective choice as
the outcome of majority vote rather than welfare maximization. Decentral-
ized decision making gives power to local majorities that may have rather
“extreme” preferences relative to those of the national median voter. Im-
posing the preferences of local majorities on local minorities may have large,
negative welfare eﬀects. When the national median voter is a “moderate”,
political centralization can be viewed as a national compromise solution that
may increase aggregate welfare by protecting the interests of local minorities.
By focusing on the conﬂict of interests at the local level, our analysis
departs from most of the recent literature on political centralization and
decentralization, see for instance Bolton and Roland (1996), Alesina and
Spolaore (1997), Ellingsen (1998), Besley and Coate (1999) and the subset
of this literature that deals with education and in particular education ﬁ-
nance systems, such as Fernández and Rogerson (1996, 1999), and Hoxby
(1996) for an overview. In this literature, regions are typically assumed to
be inhabited by people with relatively homogenous tastes. Local harmony
of preferences is perhaps a natural approach when dealing with issues of in-
ternational integration, for instance when analyzing the costs and beneﬁts of
membership in the European Union. The level of conﬂict of interests is then
likely to be greater between people of diﬀerent nationalities than between
people of the same nationality. The literature on diﬀerent education ﬁnance
systems is mainly concerned with the case of the United States. Again, local
homogeneity may be a natural benchmark also in this case, since the United
States is a more segregated society than European countries, perhaps as the
result of larger local ﬁscal autonomy and greater mobility.
Ellingsen (1998) analyses intra-regional conﬂicts. There are, however,
only two types of people in his model, and hence the possibility of cen-
2tralization representing a compromise solution is not considered. Crémer
and Palfrey (1996) also consider local conﬂicts of interests, and address the
positive issue of when regional median voters are likely to vote in favor of
centralization. In the absence of scale advantages and interregional external-
ities (as in our paper), they demonstrate that with full information about
the election outcome regional median voters will never vote for a centralized
solution. This is not surprising. If there is more uncertainty about the iden-
tity of the median voter on the local level than on the central level, however,
the majority vote on the local level may be in favor of forming, or joining, a
political union.
In the present paper people who are close to each other geographically
are not necessarily close in terms of preferences. More speciﬁcally, we assume
that all types of preferences are present in each region, but that regions dif-
fer in the composition of majority and minority interests. The variables we
focus on to analyze the trade-oﬀ between local and central decision making
are the distribution of preferences, the degree of geographical segregation,
and the degree of mobility. Several interesting results can be derived from
this framework. In addition to our main result, namely that the centralized
solution can welfare dominate decentralization even in the absence of scale
economies and externalities, we show that a reduction in the size of minori-
ties and an increase in the heterogeneity in preferences are not necessarily
arguments in favor of decentralization. Furthermore, increased mobility can
be an argument for centralization even without tax competition or any type
of externalities between jurisdictions. In the absence of side payments, ma-
jority voting at the national level over whether or not decisions should be
decentralized might result in decentralization when the welfare maximizing
choice would be centralization.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, with
Section 2.1 presenting the case without mobility and 2.2 discussing the eﬀects
of mobility. In Section 3 we discuss the case where the population structure
is such that the national median voter is an “extreme” type. Section 4
concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
People diﬀer in their preferences on public policies. One source of disagree-
ment concerns individual freedom. Some favor greater restrictions than oth-
3ers on people’s right to gamble, to sell and consume alcohol, to dress the way
they like, etc. Another source of conﬂict concerns the distribution of rights
and privileges. Discrimination of groups typically follow lines of ethnicity,
language, religion or sex, and include issues such as slavery, the freedom
to practice one’s religion, and the right of women to vote and take part in
public life. Yet another source of disagreement concerns the extent of pub-
lic involvement in the economy. Some people favor a minimalist state, the
“night watchman”, others favor a “welfare state” involving extensive public
service provision and redistribution of income and wealth.
To simplify, we assume that policies can be measured on a single dimen-
sion, denoted by g ∈ R. Low levels of g could mean very restrictive policies
on, say, gambling and alcohol, whereas high levels of g could imply very lib-
eral polices on these issues. Let individual i’s ideal policy be given by g∗
i,a n d
let i’s utility derived from this policy be given by U∗
i .S i n c eU∗
i is a constant,
we can without loss of generality let the optimal utility level be the same
for all people in the economy, i.e. U∗
i = U∗. Being exposed to policies that
diﬀer from one’s own ideal is associated with a loss of utility. We shall make
the key assumption that the utility loss is a convex function of the distance
between the actual and ideal policy.1 The utility of individual i living in a




∗ − f (|g
∗
i − gθ|), (1)
where f (|g∗
i − gθ|) is the loss function, characterized by f0,f00 > 0.O u r
formulation of preferences implies that the utility loss experienced as a result
of a given distortion between the ideal and the actual policy is the same for
all individuals.
To simplify the analysis, assume that there are three types of individuals
in the economy, θ ∈ (l,m,h),w i t hg∗
l ≤ g∗
m ≤ g∗
h. We shall sometimes refer to
g∗
m as a “compromise” solution. Heterogeneity in preferences, γ, is measured
as the distance between the two extreme positions, i.e. γ ≡ g∗
h − g∗





l + βγ, (2)
1While a convex loss function is intuitively appealing, it is perfectly possible to construct
preference systems that do not have this property. One could, for instance, imagine a
situation where people have strong preferences for a certain policy and are equally unhappy
with all other policies. If this were the case, the mechanisms emphasised in this paper
would not be relevant.
4where β ∈ (0,1) m e a s u r e st h er e l a t i v ed i s t a n c eo ft h em-type from the
l-type. For instance, if β =0 ,t h em- t y p ei si d e n t i c a lt ot h el-type, if β =1 ,
the preferences of the m-type and the h-type coincide. If β =0 .5,t h ei d e a l
policy of the m-type lies exactly in the middle of two extremes. In this
case we shall refer to m’s preferences as “average”. The more “average” are
the preferences of the m-voter, the more of a compromise solution does g∗
m
represent.
There are three relevant levels of utility loss. First, the loss associated
with the distance between the preferred policies of l and m,w h i c hw es h a l l
deﬁne as f1; second, the the loss associated with the distance h and m,
denoted by f2; and third, the loss associated with the maximum distance in
preferences, that between l and h,w h i c hw ec a l lf3. The utility losses can be
summarized as:
f1 = f (βγ)
f2 = f ((1 − β)γ)
f3 = f (γ)
(3)
Note also that f00 > 0 ⇒ f1 + f2 ≤ f3, with strict inequality holding
for β ∈ h0,1i. The relevant utility levels are summarized in the following
equations:
V l
l = V m
m = V h
h = U∗
V m
l = V l
m = U∗ − f1
V m
h = V h
m = U∗ − f2
V h
l = V l
h = U∗ − f3
(4)
Policies are determined either on a national level or on a regional level.
On the national level, which we shall also refer to as the centralized solution
or the centralized regime, the national median voter is the decisive voter.
His vote will determine the policy for the country as a whole.2 Alternatively,
policies may be deﬁned on a regional level, which we shall also refer to as the
decentralized solution or the decentralized regime, in which case the regional
median voters determine policies in their respective regions.3
2In our model, we maintain the traditional assumption of uniform policies on the na-
tional level in the centralized political solution. Besley and Coate (1999) analyse the
case where the central government can provide diﬀerent levels of public goods to diﬀerent
regions. In their analysis, the disadvantage of centralization is based on imperfections
in the democratic institutions. More speciﬁcally, the centralization equilibrium may be
characterized by overspending on public goods as local jurisdictions strategically delegate
candidates with strong preferences for public goods to the central judiciary.
3In order to focus on the central mechanism of our paper, we do not include any cost
5The main argument of this paper rests on the assumption that the na-
tional median voter is a “moderate”, i.e. an m-type. In many cases this
is likely to be a reasonable assumption. Consider, for instance, the case of
Canada. Francophiles and anglophiles may have extremely opposing views
on the importance of the french language in schools, in the media, and in
cultural life. The national median voter, on the other hand, perhaps takes
an intermediate position on this issue, for instance because she is a genuinely
bilingual person. In the Canadian case, centralization could be a way of pro-
tecting the interests of local minorities, such as the anglophiles in Quebec
and the francophiles in Vancouver. Another interesting example could be the
issue of slavery in 19th century North America. The majority of people in the
Southern states were perhaps in favor of slavery, whereas the majority in the
North were against. With the Northerners outnumbering the Southerners,
the slave minority would probably be better oﬀ with issues of slavery being
determined on the central rather than a decentral level.
But clearly, the identity of the national median voter depends on the rel-
ative number of the diﬀerent types of people. If the number of one of the
“extreme” types is greater than the number of the other two types taken to-
gether, then centralization will not result in a moderate solution. We could
perhaps think of this as the case of former Yugoslavia, with a national major-
ity of Serbs whose preferences diﬀer radically from those of ethnic minorities
such as Muslims and Croats. In Section 3 we demonstrate that when the
national median voter is an “extremist”, protection of local minorities is an
argument in favor of decentralization.
There are three regions in the economy, J ∈ (L,M,H). With at least as
many regions as there are types of people, full segregation of the population,
that is, a situation with no local minorities, is a theoretical possibility. In the
benchmark version of the model we assume that the national median voter is
a “moderate”, which in our context means an m-type. A convenient way of
assuring that this is the case, is to assume that the three types are of equal
s i z e .L e tt h em a s so fe a c ht y p eb eg i v e nb yu n i t y ,nθ =1 .
We wish to have a simple measure of minority size and segregation in
society. For this purpose, we introduce some symmetry assumptions on the
geographical distribution of the three types. More speciﬁcally, we assume
advantages of central policy making, or problems of policy competition in the decentralized
solution. It is, however, fairly clear that including such issues would strengthen the case
for centralization.
6equality in size of both the dominant groups in each region and of the local
minority groups. For concreteness, let the dominant groups be l-types in
region L, m-types in M,a n dh-types in H. This means that the size of local
minorities is given by nlM = nlH = nmL = nmH = nhL = nhM ≡ µ,w h e r e
nθJ is the share of individuals of type θ in region J. The size of the local
dominant groups is given by nlL = nmM = nhH =1− 2µ.N o t e t h a t µ is
an inverse measure of segregation in the present model. If µ = 1
3,t h e nt h e r e
is no dominant group in any region, and society is perfectly integrated. If
µ =0 , there are no local minorities, and hence society is perfectly segregated.






Decentralization may create regional diﬀerences in policy and thereby an
incentive for migration, which in turn aﬀects the size of minorities. In the
ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ea n a l y s i s ,h o w e v e r ,w ea b s t r a c tf r o mm i g r a t i o n .T h i sc a nb e
interpreted as a situation with prohibitively high migration costs, or perhaps
as the short-term eﬀect of decentralization.
2.1 The no-mobility case
We start the analysis of the no-mobility case by noting that:
Lemma 1 For µ>1
4, no group holds a simple majority in any region, and
the median voter in the decentralized regime is therefore an m-type person in
all three regions. Hence, gL = gM = gH = g∗
m.F o rµ ≤ 1
4, the local dominant
groups have simple majorities in all regions, which under decentralization
results in gL = g∗
l ,g M = g∗
m, gH = g∗
h.4
From Lemma 1 we can conclude that decentralization only aﬀects welfare
for µ ≤ 1
4, and then only in regions L and H.I fl o c a lm i n o r i t i e sa r es u ﬃciently
large, more precisely if µ>1
4, we know that the median voter is an m-type in
all regions and centralization and decentralization yield the same outcome.
For µ ≤ 1
4,i nr e g i o n sL and H, those who gain from decentralization are
the local dominant groups. With simple majorities in their respective regions,
we know from (4) that the dominant groups realize their optimal utility of
V l
l = V h
h , whereas a centralized solution would give V m
l and V m
h .T h e m-
types in L and H realize their ﬁrst best utility level V m
m under centralization,
whereas decentralization results in V l
m and V h
m. Finally, the l-types in H and
4We shall assume that for µ =1 /4 , in which case strictly speaking no regional median
voter exists, the outcome of local elections is given by the vote of the local dominant group.
7the h-types in L in a decentralized solution have utility levels V h
l = V l
h,w h i l e
centralization results in V m
l and V m
h .
R e c a l lt h a tt h es i z eo fal o c a ld o m i n a n tg r o u pi sg i v e nb y(1 − 2µ) and
the size of a local minority by µ. Using this information, the fact that
decentralization has no eﬀect on policies for µ>1
4, and the information in
(4), the welfare eﬀect of decentralization, measured as the sum of the utility




(1 − 2µ)(f1 + f2) − 2µf3 if µ ≤ 1
4
. (5)
The main result of our paper can now be expressed as:
Proposition 1 Centralization may welfare dominate decentralization.
Proof. From (5) we see that µ = 1
4 ⇒ ω = 1
2 (f1 + f2 − f3) ≤ 0,w i t h
strict inequality holding for β ∈ h0,1i.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that when collective decisions are made by
majority rule rather than by welfare maximizing governments, decentraliza-
tion does not necessarily result in a welfare gain for society. This is an in-
teresting result since it shows that Oates’ decentralization theorem does not
necessarily hold when policies are determined by the median voter rather
than by a social planner.
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that centralization weakly welfare dom-
inates decentralization for a given level of segregation in society, namely
for µ = 1
4. It is trivial to demonstrate that in a perfectly segregated soci-
ety, decentralization is the welfare superior solution; from (5) we see that
µ =0⇒ ω = f1 + f2 > 0. It is also clear from (5) that for µ ≤ 1
4,a
reduction in µ l e a d st oal i n e a ri n c r e a s ei nω,t h eﬁrst derivative given by
2(f1 + f2 + f3) > 0. Hence, there must exist a critical minority size for µ ≤ 1
4
below which ω > 0 and above which ω < 0. From (5) this critical level can
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l + V h






m − V m
m + V h






l − V m
l + V l




which using the information in (4) yields (5). Note that if we introduced a concern for
equality in the welfare function, this would add more weight to the utility loss of minorities
and thereby strengthen the central mechanism in our paper.
8We can interpret a as the disutility of being exposed to policies that are
at the maximum distance from one’s ideal position relative to the loss of
being exposed to policies that are “moderately” diﬀerent from one’s ideal.
An increase in the utility loss for those who suﬀer the most relative to those
who suﬀer less in a decentralized regime will increase a and thereby reduce ¯ µ,
meaning that centralization will be the welfare superior solution for a larger
range of minority levels. The opposite naturally holds for a reduction in a.











Figure 1: Decentralization and welfare
Moving from right to left, we see that a decrease in the size of minorities






has no eﬀect on welfare. At µ = 1
4,w ek n o wf r o m
the proof of Proposition 1 that decentralization has a negative impact on
welfare for β ∈ h0,1i. A further reduction in the size of minorities leads to
a linear increase in welfare, crossing the zero mark at µ =¯ µ.F o r µ<¯ µ,
there is a welfare gain from decentralization. Clearly, in the extreme case
of no local minorities, everyone realizes their ﬁrst best utility level under
decentralization and welfare is maximized. From Figure 1 we can conclude
that:
Corollary 1 A reduction in the size of minorities may reduce welfare under
decentralization.
9This observation is interesting because, a priori, one would perhaps expect
that the welfare gain from decentralization would be larger the smaller is the
size of minorities, i.e. the larger is the degree of segregation in society. The
intuition behind the result stated in Corollary 1 is that a reduction in the size
of minorities at µ = 1
4 leads to a shift of political power from the m-voters to
the local dominant groups. We know from the discussion above that when





,t h e i rl o s s
dominates the utility gain for the local majorities. Let us now study in more
detail the factors that determine the level of ¯ µ.W eo b s e r v et h a t :
Proposition 2 The more “average” are the preferences of the national me-
dian voter, the larger is the interval of minority sizes for which centralization
welfare dominates decentralization.
Proof. The smaller is ¯ µ, the larger is the interval of minority sizes for
which ω < 0.N o t eﬁr s tt h a tt h en u m e r a t o ri na is f3, which is independent
of β. The denominator of a is f1 + f2 ≡ f (βγ)+f ((1 − β)γ),w h i c hi s
minimized for β = 1
2. Hence, a reaches its maximum level, and therefore
¯ µ its minimum level, for β = 1
2, i.e. when the median voter has “average”
preferences. An increase in
¯ ¯β − 1
2
¯ ¯ increases ¯ µ.
Note that for β =0and β =1 , f1 + f2 = f3 ⇒ ¯ µ = 1
4. Hence, when
the m-type has preferences that are identical to one of the “extreme” groups,
centralization never welfare dominates decentralization, i.e. ω ≥ 0 for all µ.
The intuition for Proposition 2 can be seen by noting that the advantage
of centralized decision making relies on its ability to produce a compromise
solution that protects minority interests. Centralization is therefore most at-
tractive in welfare terms when the m-type has exactly “average” preferences,
i.e. for β = 1
2. The closer are the preferences of the national median voter
to one of the extreme groups, the less of a compromise does her vote in a
national election represent, and the less advantageous is the central solution.
A change in preference heterogeneity, γ,a ﬀects ¯ µ via its eﬀect on a.A n
increase in γ that increases a would reduce ¯ µ, implying an increase in the
range of minority sizes for which centralization is the welfare dominating
solution. However, to determine what that eﬀect of a change in γ on a is, we
need more information on the loss function. For instance, with a quadratic
loss function, ¯ µ is unaﬀected by γ. But, generally speaking, ¯ µ could also be
an increasing or decreasing function of γ. The interesting observation here is
that it is fully possible that an increase in preference heterogeneity reduces
10¯ µ, i.e. increases the range of minority sizes for which centralization is the
welfare dominating solution.
Even without further information on the loss function, we do, however,
know that the larger is the heterogeneity in preferences, the larger is the
maximal gain and the maximal loss from decentralization. The maximal loss
from decentralization is given for µ = 1
4. At this point, the utility loss for local
minorities dominates the gain for local majorities, and more heterogeneity
in preferences makes the situation even worse for the minority groups. The
maximal gain from decentralization is achieved under perfect segregation, i.e.
for µ =0 . I nt h i sc a s e ,t h el a r g e ri sγ, the larger is the welfare gain from
tailoring policies to local preferences.
2.2 Mobility and welfare
S of a rw eh a v ea b s t r a c t e df r o ma n ye ﬀect that decentralization may have on
the degree of segregation in society. However, with heterogenous tastes and
local diﬀerences in policies, there is an incentive for local minorities to move to
the regions oﬀering their preferred policies. We know that decentralization
leads to local diﬀerences in policy only when µ ≤ 1
4. We start with this
case. Then we consider the possibility of coordinated migration when the
pre-migration minority size is given by µ>1
4.
Clearly, for pre-migration minority size µ ≤ 1
4, mobility increases the at-
tractiveness of decentralization since at least some members of the dissatisﬁed
minorities are now able to move to the region oﬀering their ideal policies. To
demonstrate this formally in the simplest possible way, assume that people
are either perfectly mobile or perfectly immobile. Let σ denote the share
of mobile people within a preference group, and let this share be identical
across preference groups. The post-relocation share of a local minority group
relative to the total number of people in a region can therefore be expressed
as ˆ µ = µ(1 − σ). Recall that policies are the same in all regions for µ>1
4,
and hence no individual incentives for relocation exist in this range of minor-
ity sizes. Modifying (5), the welfare eﬀect of decentralization after relocation




(1 − 2ˆ µ)(f1 + f2) − 2ˆ µf3 if µ ≤ 1
4
, (7)
which is increasing in σ since ˆ µ decreases with σ.H e n c e ,i ti st r u et h a t :
11Proposition 3 Increased mobility increases welfare under decentralization
for µ ≤ 1
4.
The proof is trivial since the only eﬀect of increased mobility is to reduce
ˆ µ, i.e. reduce the number of losers and increase the number winners from
decentralization. It is also straightforward to demonstrate that:
Corollary 2 When the population is suﬃciently mobile, decentralization al-
ways welfare dominates centralization for µ ≤ 1
4.
Proof. ˆ µ ≡ µ(1 − σ) < ¯ µ ≡ 1
2(1+a) ⇒ σ >
2µ(1+a)−1
2µ(1+a) ≡ ¯ σ ⇒ ω > 0.
Similarly, if σ < ¯ σ,ω < 0.
Let us now turn our attention to the case of µ>1
4. We know that in this
case policies are the same across regions even under decentralization, deﬁned
by the preferences of the m-type. Hence, there is no individual incentive
to relocate in this case. But given that people are indiﬀerent in terms of
their locational choice, even relatively small shocks to the economy, such as
changes in the labor market, may cause relocation of people. While such
shocks are not an explicit part of our model, a reasonable assumption would
be that increased mobility increases the relocation eﬀect of a given shock
in the labor market. Hence, the higher is the mobility, the larger is the
chance that economic ﬂuctuations result in a relocation of people such that
the political power is shifted away from the m-voter and in the favor of the
local dominant groups in regions H and L.
An alternative explanation to why relocation of people could take place
for µ>1
4, and one that does not rely on external shocks, is the possibility
of coordinated migration decisions. If those who are mobile can costlessly
coordinate their relocation, there will be an incentive to move if there is
as u ﬃcient number of mobile people. For a coordinated move to change
local policies, the post-relocation degree of segregation must be such that
ˆ µ<1
4.N o t e t h a t s i n c e ˆ µ ≡ µ(1 − σ), mobility and coordination implies
that the critical level of (pre-migration) minority size at which the decisive
voter changes from an m- t y p et oar e p r e s e n t a t i v eo ft h el o c a ld o m i n a n tg r o u p
is lower than 1
4. How much lower depends on the degree of mobility in society.
It is easy to demonstrate that ˆ µ<1
4 ⇒ σ >
4µ−1
4µ ≡ σ∗. Hence, if the mobile
share of the population is suﬃciently great, more speciﬁcally larger than σ∗,
relocation will take place even when prior to relocation µ>1
4.W e c a n
therefore state that:
12Lemma 2 There is an incentive for coordinated relocation if mobility is suf-
ﬁciently high.
Moreover, we know from proof of Corollary 2 that decentralization leads
to a welfare loss if σ < ¯ σ. We can therefore conclude that with the possibility
of coordinated migration:
Proposition 4 Increased mobility may reduce welfare under decentraliza-
tion.
Proof. Given that µ>1
4, and given that we allow for the possibility of
coordinated migration, an increase in mobility from σ < σ∗ to σ ∈ (σ∗, ¯ σi
reduces welfare under decentralization.
The result that increased mobility may reduce welfare under decentral-
ization is somewhat surprising. But in terms of the mechanisms we focus
on in this paper, it makes perfect sense. Note that in a coordinated move,
the ambition of the migrants is to gain political control in the destination
region. If the mobility in society is high enough to allow them to do so, but
not high enough to allow a suﬃcient share of the local minorities to relocate,
then mobility may lead to a welfare loss under decentralization. Formally,
this takes place for mobility levels in the interval σ ∈ (σ∗, ¯ σi. This result is
related to our ﬁnding in the no-mobility case that a reduction in the size of
minorities can reduce welfare under decentralization, as stated in Corollary
1. An increase in mobility that leads to a reduction in the size of minorities
is therefore potentially welfare reducing.
3 An “extremist” national median voter
So far we have assumed that the national median voter represents a moderate
position. What happens if one of the extremist groups, say, group h,h a sa
simple majority in national elections? With the mass of l-types and m-types
still measured by unity, let nh = α ≥ 2. The size of the h-community in H is
now given by α − 2αµ, with the size of the h-community residing in each of
the other two regions, L and M,g i v e nb yαµ. Since the h-group has a simple
majority in region H, decentralization does not aﬀect the political outcome
for people in this region. Hence, we can concentrate on what happens in
regions L and M. We now have to consider the possibility of one type, the
h-type, having simple majority in all regions. It is straightforward to show
that:
13Lemma 3 When αµ =1− 2µ + µ,t h eh-group in L and M constitutes
exactly half of the population in these regions. Hence, for µ> 1
1+α ≡ µH,
the h-type has simple majority in all regions. In this case, centralization and
decentralization yield the same outcome, namely gL = gM = gH = g∗
h.W h e n
1 − 2µ = µ + αµ,t h el-group in L and the m-group in M constitute exactly
half of the population in their respective regions. Hence, for µ<µ L ≡ 1
3+α,
the l-voters have simple majority in L as do the m-voters in M.I nt h i sc a s e ,
decentralization results in gL = g∗
l ,g M = g∗
m, gH = g∗
h.F o r µ ∈ (µL,µ H)
no group has simple majority in L and M, and policies in these regions
are therefore deﬁned by the preferences of type m. Hence, in this interval,
decentralization yields gL = gM = g∗
m and gH = g∗
h.
The welfare eﬀect of decentralization can in this case be expressed as:6
˜ ω =
0 if µ>µ H
(1 − µ)(f2 + f3 − f1) − 2αµf2 if µ ∈ (µL,µ H)
[1 − µ(1 + α)](f2 + f3) − 2µf1 if µ<µ L
. (8)
From (8) we can demonstrate that:
Proposition 5 When the national median voter is an “extremist”, decen-
tralization weakly welfare dominates centralization.
Proof. It is straightforward to demonstrate that µ = µH ⇒ ˜ ω =
(1 − µ)(f3 − f1 − f2) > 0,a n dt h a tµ = µL ⇒ ˜ ω =2 µ(f2 + f3 − f1) > 0,
and that ˜ ω increases as µ goes down in the intervals µ ∈ (µL,µ H) and µ<µ L.
Recall that in the benchmark version of the model, the beneﬁto fc e n -
tralization was that it protected the interests of local minorities by oﬀering
a more moderate solution than the one preferred by local dominant groups.
When the national median voter himself is an extremist, centralization natu-
rally loses its ability to generate a compromise solution. In fact, decentraliza-
tion in this case represents a possible way of creating compromise solutions.
This is clear from the fact that by decentralizing, political power in regions
L and M is shifted from the h-type to the m-type for µ ∈ (µL,µ H).
6For µ ∈ (µL,µ H):
˜ ω =( 1− 2µ)
¡
V m
m − V h
m + V m
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14Earlier, in connection with Proposition 2, we studied the case where the
m-type was an “extremist”, i.e. β =0or β =1 .T h i se ﬀectively means a situ-
ation with two groups, both with “extreme” preferences, and one group twice
as large as the other. In this two-group case, decentralization also welfare
dominates centralization for all geographical distributions of the population,
e x a c t l ya si nt h ep r e s e n tt h r e e - g r o u pc a s ew h e r eo n eo ft h e“ e x t r e m e ”t y p e s
has a simple majority in national elections. The reason for the welfare dom-
inance of decentralization in the two-group case is non-existence of voters
with “moderate” preferences. In the present case, “moderate” voters exist
but do not have any political inﬂuence in national elections. The moderate
position may, however, win the vote in local elections, and hence, the need
to protect minorities could be an argument in favor of decentralization in the
present case.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The idea underlying this paper is that decentralization has one advantage
and one disadvantage. The advantage lies in the possibility of adjusting local
policies to local tastes. The disadvantage is related to the fate of minorities. If
the national median voter represents a “moderate” position, decentralization
may result in more “extreme” solutions that reduce the well-being of local
m i n o r i t i e s . T h es i z eo ft h i sl o s sd e p e n d so nt h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fp r e f e r e n c e s
and the size of minorities. The advantage with the centralized solution is
thus that it provides some protection to minorities by avoiding “extreme”
solutions.
The main results in the paper are as follows. First, centralization may
welfare dominate decentralization even in the absence of scale economies and
interregional externalities. Second, increased segregation, in the form of a
reduction in the size of minorities, is not necessarily an argument for decen-
tralization. On the contrary, if the initial level of segregation is relatively
low, then a reduction in the size of minorities could make it more impor-
tant to centralize political authority. Third, the more the national median
voter represents an average position relative to the preferences of the two
extreme views, the more attractive is the centralized solution from a welfare
perspective. The fourth result concerns the relationship between heterogene-
ity and decentralization. An increase in heterogeneity is not necessarily an
argument for decentralization. Increased heterogeneity increases the disu-
15tility of minorities and may thus increase the importance of a centralized
decision structure in order to maximize total welfare. Increased mobility can
be an argument for centralization when coordinated relocation is possible.
Finally, the paper demonstrates that when the national median voter is an
“extreme” type, the need to protect local minorities can be an argument in
favor of decentralization.
I nt h ea n a l y s i sw eh a v ec o m p a r e dw e l f a re levels under the regimes, central
and decentralized provision of public services. If the national median voter
could choose between the two regimes, which one would be preferred? Con-
sider the benchmark case of equal population size and no mobility. We then
know that in the absence of side-payments, and for µ ≤ 1
4,t h em a j o r i t yo ft h e
population in regions L and H would support decentralization. The people
in M would be indiﬀerent and the minorities in L and H would be against.
If those who are indiﬀerent do not take part in the election, or split their
votes equally for and against decentralization, we know that decentralization
in this case will get a majority of the votes.7 Thus, majority voting at the
national level may result in decentralization where the welfare maximizing
choice is the centralized solution.
Mobility increases the support for decentralization, since once decentral-
ized public ﬁnance is established, the mobile minorities will take advantage
of the increased variety in public policies and relocate to the region oﬀering
their preferred policy.
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